New Sheriff in Town: Treasury Proposes Unprecedented Outbound Investment Screening Regulations
New Sheriff in Town: Treasury Proposes Unprecedented Outbound Investment Screening Regulations
On June 21, 2024, the Biden administration rolled out outbound investment screening regulations. Last year, the Biden administration published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) that outlined the broad parameters of this program and asked for feedback. The latest publication addresses this feedback, adds important details, and again asks impacted parties for feedback. As a proposed rule, the regulations will not be effective until publication of a final rule.
The updated proposed regulations would place obligations on any U.S. person in connection with certain transactions involving or resulting in the establishment of a “covered foreign person.” The regulations focus on the foreign person’s relationship to China (the sole country designated as a “country of concern”), and its involvement in one or more “covered activities,” which are related to sensitive national security related technologies and products, such as certain artificial intelligence systems, quantum computing, and microelectronics.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) scrutinizes analogous inbound investments by foreign persons in U.S. businesses. CFIUS has the authority to review transactions that give foreign persons control over a U.S. business and certain non-passive, non-controlling investments by foreign persons in U.S. businesses engaged in sensitive activities.
The outbound investment screening regulations would allow the U.S. government—for the first time—to scrutinize investments by U.S. persons in companies outside the United States. Much like CFIUS, the outbound investment screening program jurisdiction hinges on three elements—a covered foreign person, a U.S. person, and a transaction. We cover each of these elements in detail below.
Transactions that meet these criteria are called “covered transactions,” which can be “prohibited,” meaning the transaction cannot legally be undertaken, or “notifiable,” meaning that it is permitted under the proposed rule but would require the submittal of information to the Department of the Treasury. A U.S. person would also have certain obligations under the outbound investment screening regulations in connection with certain transactions undertaken by any non-U.S. person entity that it controls.
The proposed rule is more mature than the broad strokes of the ANPRM, and this maturation reveals important takeaways for the investment and technology sectors. Nevertheless, the proposed rule leaves many important questions unanswered.
The regulations define the term “covered foreign person” as a person of a country of concern that engages in a covered activity or, directly or indirectly, holds certain rights or derives certain income from covered persons or activities. The following graphic identifies these elements and illustrates that, in many cases involving complex structures, parties may have a difficult time definitively delineating covered foreign persons from others.
The proposed rule also provides helpful examples, including an example indicating that when a company holds equity interests in one or more persons of a country of concern engaged in a covered activity that comprise 51 percent of the net income of the company, it is a covered foreign person under the regulations. Treasury declined to include a de minimis threshold below which a person of a country of concern’s activity would not trigger the definition of covered activity, partly because the financial significance of a covered activity in relation to any particular entity does not necessarily correspond to the national security significance of such activity.
As with similar regulatory regimes, the outbound investment screening regulations apply to any (i) United States citizen, (ii) lawful permanent resident, and (iii) entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of any such entity, or (iv) any person in the United States.
The outbound investment screening regulations cover transactions where a U.S. person, directly or indirectly:
If the transaction is a “covered transaction,” it can be either prohibited or subject to notification requirements, depending on the activities (or covered activities) of the target.
Prohibited transactions. For a transaction to be prohibited, the covered activity will include:
Sector | Activity | Technology/Capability |
Semiconductors and Microelectronics | Development or production of | Electronic design automation software for the design of integrated circuits or advanced packaging |
Front-end semiconductor fabrication equipment designed for performing the volume fabrication of integrated circuits | ||
Equipment for performing volume advanced packaging | ||
Commodity, material, software, or technology designed exclusively for use in or with extreme UV lithography fabrication equipment | ||
Design of | Integrated circuits that meet or exceed the performance parameters in ECCN 3A090.a in supplement No. 1 to 15 CFR part 774 | |
Integrated circuits designed for operation at or below 4.5 Kelvin | ||
Fabrication of | Logic integrated circuits using a non-planar transistor architecture or with a production technology node of 16/14 nanometers or less (including FDSOI circuits) | |
NAND memory ICs with 128 layers or more | ||
DRAM ICs using a technology node of 18 nm half-pitch or less | ||
Integrated circuits manufactured from a gallium-based compound semiconductor | ||
Integrated circuits using graphene transistors or carbon nanotubes | ||
Integrated circuits designed for operation at or below 4.5 Kelvin | ||
Packaging of | Integrated circuits, using advanced packaging techniques | |
Quantum Information Technology | Development, installation, sale, or production of | Supercomputers enabled by advanced ICs that can provide a theoretical compute capacity of 100 or more double-precision (64-bit) petaflops or 200 or more single-precision (32-bit) petaflops of processing power within a 41,600 cubic foot or smaller envelope |
Development or production of | A quantum computer or any of its critical components, such as a dilution refrigerator or two-stage pulse tube cryocooler | |
A quantum sensing platform designed for, or which the covered foreign person intends to use for, any military, government intelligence, or mass-surveillance end use | ||
A quantum network designed for, or intended to be used for, networking to scale up capabilities of quantum computers, such as for breaking/compromising encryption | ||
A quantum network designed for, or intended to be used for, secure communications, such as quantum key distribution | ||
A quantum network or quantum communications system designed for, or intended to be used for, any military, government intelligence, or mass-surveillance end use | ||
Artificial Intelligence | Development of | Any AI system that is designed to be exclusively used for, or which the covered foreign person intends to use for, military end use (e.g., weapons targeting, target identification, combat simulation, military vehicle or weapon control, military decision-making, weapons design, or combat system logistics and maintenance) |
Any AI system that is designed to be exclusively used for, or which the covered foreign person intends to use for, government intelligence or mass surveillance (e.g., through mining text, audio, or video; image recognition; location tracking; or surreptitious listening) | ||
Development of AI that is trained using | Computing power greater than 1024 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations) [1] | |
Computing power greater than 1023 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations) using primarily biological sequence data | ||
List-Based Restrictions | Engages in a covered activity | Included on the BIS Entity List |
Included on the BIS Military End User List | ||
Included in the definition of “Military Intelligence End-User” in 15 CFR 744.22(f)(2) | ||
Included on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List | ||
An entity in which one or more individuals or entities included on the SDN List in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, own a 50 percent or greater interest | ||
Included on Treasury’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (“NS-CMIC List”) | ||
Designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 |
Notifiable Transactions. For a transaction to be notifiable, the covered activity will include:
Sector | Activity | Technology/Capability |
Integrated Circuits | Design of | Any integrated circuit that is not described in the above table (§§ 850.224(c)–(e)) |
Fabrication of | ||
Packaging of | ||
Artificial Intelligence | Development of | Any AI system not otherwise described that is designed to be used for any government intelligence or mass-surveillance end use |
Any AI system not otherwise described that is intended by the covered foreign person to be used for cybersecurity applications, digital forensics tools, penetration testing tools, or control of robotic systems | ||
Any AI system that is not otherwise described and is trained using a quantity of computing power greater than 1023 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations)[2] |
The obligations of U.S. persons under the outbound investment screening regulations apply if such person has knowledge of relevant facts or circumstances related to a transaction. As with other similar regimes, the rule elaborates on what it means for a person to “have knowledge” of a fact or circumstance. A U.S. person may be assessed to “have knowledge” if the U.S. person possesses actual knowledge that a fact or circumstance exists or is substantially certain to occur; possesses an awareness of a high probability of a fact or circumstance’s existence or future occurrence; or could have possessed such information through a reasonable and diligent inquiry.
The outbound investment screening regulations contain exceptions for certain types of transactions, which include:
Buyouts: Buyouts of country of concern ownership, such that the entity would not constitute a covered foreign person following the transaction;
Certain internal transactions: Intracompany transactions between a U.S. parent and a majority-controlled subsidiary to support ongoing operations or other non-covered activities;
Preexisting commitments: Transactions fulfilling a binding, uncalled, capital commitment entered into prior to August 9, 2023; and
Additionally, certain transactions involving a person from a country or territory outside the United States may be excepted transactions where the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the country or territory is addressing national security concerns posed by outbound investment and the transaction is of a type for which the associated national security concerns are likely to be adequately addressed by the actions of that country or territory.
The outbound investment screening regulations include a penalty and disclosure framework.
Comments for the outbound investment screening regulations are due by August 4, 2024. Although the outbound investment screening regulations are not yet final, the proposed regulations illustrate the framework for what will likely become law. So impacted parties, in addition to considering comments, should start assessing the effects of these regulations on their operations and what, if any, steps they should proactively take prior to the regulations becoming effective.
[1] For the computation power thresholds, the outbound investment screening regulations contain alternative proposals for public comment.
[2] For the computation power threshold, the outbound investment screening regulations contain alternative proposals for public comments.
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